Queen's Business Law Symposium 1998
SELF-REGULATION OR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION:
ISSUES AND FRAMEWORKS FOR LAW REFORM
John D. Gregory(1)
General Counsel
Policy Branch
Business Policy and Planning Division
Ministry of the Attorney General (Ontario)
The principal paper in this session, "Self-Regulation or Government Intervention? The
International Business Alliance and the OECD Ministerial Conference on Electronic
Commerce", by Robert Keyes and Eric Iankelovic of the Canadian Council for
International Business, relates how many big business enterprises around the world
cooperated to influence the agenda and the content of the OECD Ministerial Conference
held in Ottawa in October 1998. Business interests, and the paper describing them,
generally urged governments to keep hands off electronic commerce so that the private
sector could develop it freely, using "self-regulation" to ensure that the market forces
were to some extent controlled in the public interest.
It is easy enough to agree with the authors' suggestion that the legal framework for
electronic commerce should be "transparent, flexible and technology neutral". Few
people suggest anything else, except for some advocacy of specific rules to support the
use of public key cryptography to create digital signatures. Certainly the OECD
Ministerial Conference(2), the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law(3),
and domestic law reform efforts in Canada(4), the United States(5), and elsewhere(6), all
subscribe to these principles, expressly or in practice.(7)
However, one is perhaps a shade less confident than Messrs Keyes and Iankelovic that
self-regulation always means real regulation, or that it operates in the public interest.
Not all market sectors are willing or able to regulate themselves adequately; it requires a
certain maturity and sense of enlightened self-interest that are not universal. Much of
the economic history of the twentieth century has been devoted to finding a productive
balance between the untrammeled interests of business and the needs of the
communities in which business operates. The same balancing will be required for
electronic commerce.
In favour of a light hand
A number of factors militate in favour of a "light hand" in regulating electronic commerce.
Here are a few of them:
Society becomes more comfortable with any technology over time, and part of the
comfort is confidence that existing legal rules can handle the challenges that seem
unique when the technology is new. We have seen this with the telegraph, the
telephone and the fax machine. Between the flexibility of the law and the ability of the
technology itself to solve some of the problems, it is often safe to wait and see if
apparent problems need new law.(8)
Much law, especially commercial law, aims to ensure that current market practices are
legally effective, rather than to change them. It is more descriptive than prescriptive. In
electronic commerce, the technology and its implementations are changing so quickly
that law reformers have a hard time assigning legal consequences to its current state.
By the time proposed rules get through the legislatures, the current state exists no more.
Legislation therefore risks irrelevance, at best, or a harmful freezing of technology in the
stage contemplated when the legislation was conceived. Few if any law reformers
advocate slowing down commercial innovation in this field, and certainly not as a
by-product of seeking some other goal.
Because electronic commerce passes over borders so easily, enforcing any rules of law,
and particularly ones that business finds restrictive or expensive, is very difficult.
Governments do not want to drive legitimate business away. One sees this in the
caution generally shown on the question of "taxing the Internet"; no one wants to be the
first to tax, because of the fear that business will leave the jurisdiction, only to "enter"
again via cyberspace, beyond the effective reach of regulators. Likewise, a more
activist regulatory program risks chasing businesses to friendlier jurisdictions. At the
limit, one may fear a "race to the bottom", where businesses end up in the most
hospitable jurisdiction, the one with the lowest standards. This paper addresses in a
later section some reasons why this practice may find its own limits.
The best chance of acceptability in these circumstances goes to rules that have
achieved some international consensus. Such consensus is usually achieved only for
"high level" statements of pretty general principle, not for detailed regulation.
In favour of active regulation
Set against these reasons are some principles that may promote a more activist notion
of government action. For example:
The task of government is broader than simply to promote the growth of or interests of
business. In one phrase, the concern is "peace, order and good government" for
everyone in the territory governed.
The interests of business are not necessarily or always the public's interest. Clearly the
public has an interest in a healthy economy that creates jobs and the wealth that can be
shared among residents of the country. However, markets can fail, and government
may have to help. Knowing when and why markets have failed is its own challenge.
The principal paper speaks frequently of what "the private sector" wants. It is important
to note that the private sector does not consist solely of business, especially big
international business of the kinds involved in lobbying the OECD. Consumers are the
private sector, and voluntary associations, and charities, and non-governmental
organizations, and indeed "citizens" who deal with each other and the state for many
reasons and in many relationships that are not commercial. Government action does
not always regulate or restrict the private sector; sometimes it helps one part of the
private sector in dealings with another. The OECD Ministers heard from labour groups
and consumer groups as well as business groups. Even these groupings do not
encompass all the interests that might promote legitimate state action.
Many of these arguments apply to any government regulation of business, electronic or
not. The context changes and the balance may change, but they do not change so
radically that what we have learned before must be set aside.
Options for intervention
Governments have a number of ways of intervening, and a number of places where they
may intervene. It may be helpful to think of a couple of fundamental distinctions in
possible government action, with different policy and practical considerations in each.
Public or private law?
The first distinction is that between public law and private law matters. The outline of
recent law reform initiatives(9) dealt almost exclusively with private law issues. The
public law area is the one most likely to create controversy, and the one most likely to be
seen as undue interference. Some areas of public law that affect electronic commerce
include taxation, as noted earlier; intellectual property, particularly copyright and trade
marks; trade law, including technical standards as possible non-tariff barriers to
international commerce; privacy; competition; content regulation, whether in the
interests of criminal justice (child pornography, hate literature) or cultural promotion
(Canadian content, language laws); and equality of access. Ensuring widespread
access to the Internet as the tool of electronic commerce is more a social policy than a
legal issue, but some states intervene in the e-commerce marketplace by levying
charges on service providers, for example, to subsidize access by others.
Private law matters, generally speaking, affect the rights between parties to a
transaction rather than the public at large. Such matters are often resoluble by contract
between the parties - "private law" in a pure sense. However, law reform is sometimes
necessary because not all private law questions are amenable to contract. Not all
electronic communications have "another side" with whom to contract; they may be
addressed to the world at large, or impracticably large numbers for agreements as to the
legal effects of the communications.
Sometimes the parties to a contract are in severely unequal bargaining positions, so
their agreement may simply be so unfair to the weaker party that the law will not support
it, or that the law must intervene to protect the vulnerable. This concern is of course not
unique to electronic commerce, and to some extent it may be handled by the general
law of unconscionability. Some jurisdictions have proposed technical standards to
private law reform in order to ensure that the weaker contracting party may not be driven
to accept an unfair risk.(10)
Sometimes the policy behind a form requirement, such as that a document be in writing
or signed, is so strong that private parties are not allowed to opt out of the requirement
by agreement. Even law reform efforts sometimes stop before such a policy. Article 4
of the United Nations Model Law on Electronic Commerce(11) does not allow parties to
opt out of the standards for electronic documents set out in Chapter II of Part One. The
general permission to use electronic documents in the new Illinois Electronic Commerce
Security Act of 1998(12) is qualified so it will not apply to an existing rule of law where the
general permission is "clearly inconsistent with the manifest intent" of the lawmaking
body or repugnant to the context of the same body of law".
Contracting parties are restricted in their ability to tailor private law to their needs where
a public element plays a role, most often in a requirement that a document be filed on a
public register. The legal effect of the material may depend on filing. Without law
reform or at least an administrative action of a public body, the parties will not be able to
file their material in electronic form.
Regulation or validation?
Another distinction to keep in mind in evaluating the desirability of government
"intervention" is that between intervention to regulate and intervention to validate. This
distinction overlaps to some extent, but not completely, the public law/private law divide
just discussed. In addition, the division between regulation and validation is not
watertight, any more than the line between public and private law. The categories
nevertheless seem helpful in understanding the response of the business world to
certain kinds of law reform.
The clients may not always make this distinction in the first instance. Lawyers frequently
hear the question, "Is it legal?" The question may mean "Is it permitted?", a question
about criminal consequences. However, it may also mean "is it enforceable?", a
questions about civil consequences. The first variant deals with regulation, the second
with validation.
The policy reasons for regulation are not much in doubt, nor do they vary between
regulating commerce in general and regulating it in an electronic form. The debate for
e-commerce is likely to focus more on the practicability of the regulation, not its intent.
The policy reasons for validating electronic documents used in commerce are fairly clear
too: a desire to permit efficient use of technology, maintain competitiveness, extend the
reach of one's economic activity, and the like. Sometimes, however, there are reasons
not to give complete validity to electronic records. This is what makes law reform more
difficult. For example, questions of fairness may arise. Some people should not be
forced to accept electronic documents if they do not want them. Sometimes the
standards for notices on paper serve an important function that cannot readily be
reproduced electronically.
At other times, one seeks to ensure the validity of a public record in which the
documents are to be filed. Different security systems may be needed for different
records. In Ontario, for example, one has for several years been able to file financing
statements under the Personal Property Security Act electronically.(13) These statements
are public notice of the existence of a security agreement between a creditor and a
debtor, and the order of filing determines priorities among competing creditors when
security is being realized or when the debtor becomes insolvent. However, the
statements are not the agreements themselves; they are still kept by the parties.
This may be contrasted with the proposed electronic registration of land transfers in
Ontario. Under the Land Registration Reform Act(14), the electronic record of title in the
public register will constitute the true register, not to be contradicted by any paper
document purporting to show something else. In other words, the legal effect of the
electronic filing and the resulting electronic register is much more extensive for land
registration. As a result, the technical standards for such filing are a good deal more
demanding.
These two cases show that a general validation of electronic commercial documents
would be inappropriate. The law reformer has to keep in mind the purpose for which
the electronic documents will be used and the threats and risks to their proper
effectiveness. Most of the law reform efforts described in the early part of this paper aim
at private law and promote validity of economic records and do not try to regulate them
(though of course setting conditions on how to achieve validity is a kind of regulation:
"do it this way and you will have legal effect" is much like saying "you must do it this
way".)(15)
Same as or better than paper?
A third point of distinction to keep in mind in evaluating law reform is what we have
today, on paper, and what we hope to achieve electronically. In short, we should not
overestimate the security, reliability or predictability of our paper documents. A
handwritten signature is only an approximate indication of the source of a signed
document, and very slight indication at all of its integrity. The paper by Keyes and
Iankelovic speaks of the need for a "predictable legal framework", and says that without
appropriate harmonized lawmaking, "predictability will be a feature of the past". Some
would argue that the current world trading system has insufficient predictability and great
uncertainties, as to legal effects, legal enforceability, and legal costs. Nevertheless
global trade exists.
All business at all time involves calculating risks and managing them. Electronic
commerce will not change that. A lot of electronic commerce happens now, and the
amount is growing. Business to business commerce is the bulk of this data flow. Most
of the businesses carrying out this activity have lawyers, who may be in the back room
with their fingers crossed, but the trade goes on because the business people estimate
that the potential profit is greater than the likely loss.
There are many ways of establishing secure economic relations besides legal rules.
Law in support of technology is not necessarily the best way to create security. The
legal rules themselves may leave much detail to be worked out in particular cases, in
part because the speed of technological change does not allow greater precision, as
noted earlier. Such new rules do not leave businesses unarmed, or worse off in the
electronic age than they were before. Custom, contract and technology will fill the gaps,
just as they do today with paper. We are so accustomed to paper that we do not
appreciate the assumptions that support its use. As we become accustomed to
electronic communications, comfort will grow there too.
Familiar institutions will help businesses acclimatize too. Financial institutions will be the
"trusted third party" to many transactions, not in a public key cryptography sense of
issuing certificates to support digital signatures, but in providing assurances of payment
in dealing with strangers across the world. The world-wide banking system will facilitate
electronic commerce. Governments too will play this role, partly as model users of
electronic commerce, to help people get used to the new ways, and partly as legal
validator, and partly as welcome regulator.
Virtual communities
These thoughts lead to the closing argument of this paper, that much of the future of
electronic commerce rests in virtual communities with a manageable framework of
relationships to provide the assurance that businesses and their customers will want.
Customers - including businesses that are other businesses' customers - will not want to
deal with enterprises located in places with the lowest level of legal support. They will
take no comfort from a potential partner in a data haven. The "race to the bottom" may
not produce many winners.
Virtual communities will rest on a number of supports, such as the voluntary law of
contract and a network of "trusted third parties" who can vouch for the solvency of
trading partners or the respect of privacy standards(16) by members of the community.
Many will find comfort in the voluntary submission to good rules of state law.
Businesses will thrive on their "reputation capital", being known as reliable traders
because of all of these attributes.
One sees the beginnings of such communities with America On-Line (aol.com), which
offers virtual shopping malls and which stands behind the quality of the merchandise
offered through its electronic sites. Consumers do not have to know or trust the
merchants because they know or trust AOL, just as they deal with well-known
merchants or brands in the physical world for the same reasons.(17)
It has been argued that on-line gambling will be a good source of revenue for the
reputable state that chooses to host it rather than chase it away. A gaming site that can
offer to potential clients a thorough regulatory environment has a competitive advantage,
since the clients will have greater assurance that the games are not fixed and that their
winnings will actually be paid out to them.(18)
Part of what is needed to create virtual communities is targeted law reform.(19) Part of
that law reform will be enabling legislation, and part of it will be regulation. Some of the
regulation at least will be welcome to the businesses that know how to profit from its
application, by complying with it and advertising their compliance. The reputation of the
regulator will enhance the reputation of the business subject to regulation, to the
advantage of both.
If this is what the business alliance was asking the OECD ministers for, their pressure
can only be welcomed.
[December 1998]
1. The author chairs a working group of the Uniform Law Conference of Canada to
create a legal framework for electronic commerce. A Director of the Information
Technology Lawyers' Association of Canada (IT.Can), he is also a member of the
Canadian delegation to the UNCITRAL working group on electronic commerce. The
views expressed here are his own and not necessarily those of his employer or any
other organization.
2. The results of the Conference are online.
3. See the Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996), and reports of the further work
on electronic commerce
4. See thePersonal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act; and the work
of the Uniform Law Conference of Canada under Electronic Commerce.
5. See in particular the draft Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
6. See the Australian experts' report and draft legislation and supporting material.
7. For more detail about such efforts, see my companion paper, "Canadian and
Multilateral Initiatives in Law Reform", made available at the Symposium.
8. For more on this theme, see my "Solving Legal Issues in Electronic Commerce",
forthcoming in (1999) 32 Canadian Business Law Journal Number 1.
9. See footnote 6 above.
10. The Australian experts' report cited in footnote 6 above raises the question of
special rules to ensure contracts on standards are fair, and the September 1998 draft of
the American Uniform Electronic Transactions Act allocated legal consequences to the
use of a "commercially unreasonable security procedure". (Sections 1-109, 1-110.
Those provisions have been reworked.) See the work on the UETA as cited above in
footnote 5.
11. See footnote 3 above.
12. See Illinois Act, at section 5-115.
13. The general authority for electronic filing in this case is found in the Electronic
Registration Act (Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations Statutes) 1991, S.O.
1991 c. 44.
14. R.S.O. 1990 c. L.4. as amended by S.O. 1994 c. 27 s 85
15. Sometimes validation laws prescribe in great detail the conditions of validity, and
may set up licensing schemes to achieve it. This is the pattern of the Utah Digital
Signature Act, Utah Code Annotated ch 46-3-101, 1996 , followed by Singapore in its
Electronic Transactions Act of 1998.
16. The "trust-e" certificate for web sites that meet privacy standards is described
elsewhere in this symposium. The Better Business Bureau in the United States runs a
similar program.
17. AOL's policy is described at the AOL web site.
18. This argument was made by David Post in "Betting in Cyberspace" in the American
Lawyer, June 1997, page 96. He has another article on the general theme as well.
19. Some of this theme can be found in a paper by Professor Amelia Boss, of Temple
University, given in Montreal in August 1995 to the World Electronic Commerce Institute:
"Security: It Ain't Just a Matter of Encryption". Security includes "a discernible legal and
social structure that both allows us to define our own rights [and] the rights of others,
and gives us the ability to determine the risks that we face and [make] intelligent choices
about their distribution."
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